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TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS-
REGULATION DISCRIMINATORY AND LEGISLATIVE
AND THEREFORE INVALID
Plaintiff physician sought a refund of federal income taxes on the
ground that he was taxed as a partnership rather than as a corporation.'
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
entered an order granting plaintiff-taxpayer a refund on the basis that
he was entitled to corporate tax treatment. 2 On appeal by the govern-
ment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held,
affirmed: Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2(h) is invalid because it is
arbitrarily discriminatory in its tax treatment of professional service cor-
porations as opposed to nonprofessional service corporations, and is leg-
islative in nature.' Said regulation was not promulgated contempora-
1. Plaintiff was an employee of an entity organized in accordance with the Florida Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 621 (1961). (1965 amendments to chapter
621 are not applicable to this case.)
2. Kurzner v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
3. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553:
[Tihe labels applied by local law to organizations, which may now or hereafter be
authorized by local law, are in and of themselves of no importance in the classifica-
tion of such organizations for the purposes of taxation under the Internal Revenue
Code. Thus, a professional service organization, formed under the law of a State
authorizing the formation by one or more persons of a so-called professional service
corporation, would not be classified for purposes of taxation as a "corporation"
merely because the organization was so labeled under local law. See Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The classification in which a professional service
organization belongs is determined under the tests and standards set forth in
§§ 301.7701-2, 301.7701-3, and 301.7701-4.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 553, as pertinent hereto provides:
(h) Classification of professional service organizations. (1) (i) A professional
service organization is treated as a corporation (or as an association and, therefore,
taxable as a corporation) only if it has sufficient corporate characteristics to be
classifiable as a corporation . . . rather than as a partnership or proprietorship. For
purposes of determining the classification of an organization under these regulations,
the term "professional service organization," as used in this paragraph, means an
organization formed by one or more persons to engage in a business involving the
performance of professional services for profit which under local law, may not be
organized and operated in the form of an ordinary business corporation having the
usual characteristics of such a corporation. Thus, even if a professional service
organization is organized as an ordinary business corporation, this paragraph applies
if such corporation is subject to local regulatory rules which deprive such corpo-
ration of the usual characteristics of an ordinary business corporation. This para-
graph applies irrespective of whether an organization is labeled under local law as
a professional service corporation, a professional service association, a trust, or
otherwise.
(ii) In determining whether a professional service organization has the major
characteristics ordinarily found in a business corporation and whether any other
significant factors are to be taken into account in classifying the organization, the
special professional requirements of the profession engaged in by the members of the
organization must be taken into consideration. Although such an organization may
have associates and is engaged in business for profit, the relationships of the members
of such an organization to each other as well as their relationships to employees, to
clients, patients, or customers and to the public are inherently different from the
relationships characteristic of an ordinary business corporation. In determining the
nature of these relationships, consideration must be given to the law under which the
organization is formed, the character, articles of association, bylaws, or other docu-
ments relating to the formation of the organization, and all other facts and rules
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governing or pertaining to such relationships in the usual course of the practice of
the profession of the participants.
(2) A professional service organization does not have continuity of life . . . if
the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, professional dis-
qualification, or election to inconsistent public office of any member will (determined
without regard to any agreement among the members) cause under local law the
dissolution of the organization .... If local law, applicable regulations, or professional
ethics do not permit a member of a professional service organization to share in its
profits unless an employment relationship exists between him and the organization,
and if in such case, he or his estate is required to dispose of his interest in the
organization if the employment relationship terminates, the continuing existence of
the organization depends upon the willingness of its remaining members, if any,
either to agree, by prior arrangement or at the time of such termination, to acquire
his interest or to employ his proposed successor. The continued existence of such a
professional service organization is similar to that of a partnership formed under the
Uniform Partnership Act, whose business continues pursuant to an agreement pro-
viding that the business will be continued by the remaining members after the with-
drawal or death of a partner . . . and is essentially different from the continuity of
life possessed by an ordinary business corporation. Consequently, such a professional
service organization lacks continuity of life.
(3) . . . [A] professional service organization does not have centralization of
management where the managers of a professional service organization under local
law are not vested with the continuing exclusive authority to determine any one or
more of the following matters: (i) The hiring and firing of professional members of
the organization and its professional and lay employees, (ii) the compensation of the
members and of such employees, (iii) the conditions of employment-such as work-
ing hours, vacation periods, and sick leave, (iv) the persons who will be accepted as
clients or patients, (v) who will handle each individual case or matter, (vi) the pro-
fessional policies and procedures to be followed in handling each individual case,
(vii) the fees to be charged by the organization, (viii) the nature of the records to
be kept, their use, and their disposition, and (ix) the times and amounts of distri-
butions of the earnings of the organization to its members as such. Moreover, al-
though a measure of central control may exist in a professional service organization,
the managers of a professional service organization in which a member retains
traditional professional responsibility cannot have the continuing exclusive authority
to determine all of the matters described in the preceding sentence. Instead, such
measure of central control is no more than that existing in an ordinary large pro-
fessional partnership which has one or more so-called managing partners and in
which a member retains the traditional professional autonomy with respect to pro-
fessional decisions and the traditional responsibility of a professional person to the
client or patient. Such measure of central control is essentially different from the
centralization of management existing in an ordinary business corporation. There-
fore, centralization of management does not exist in such a professional service
organization.
(4) A professional service organization has the corporate characteristic of limited
liability . . . only if the personal liability of its members, in their capacity as mem-
bers of the organization, is no greater in any aspect than that of shareholder-
employees of an ordinary business corporation. If under local law and the rules
pertaining to professional practice, a mutual agency relationship, similar to that
existing in an ordinary professional partnership, exists between the members of a
professional service organization, such organization lacks the corporate characteristic
of limited liability.
(5) (i) If the right of a member of a professional service organization to share
in its profits is dependent upon the existence of an employment relationship between
him and the organization, free transferability of interests . . . exists only if the
member, without the consent of other members, may transfer both the right to
share in the profits of the organization and the right to an employment relationship
with the organization.
(ii) The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests exists in a
modified form . . . when a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation can
transfer his interest in such corporation only after having offered such interest to
the other shareholders at its fair market value. In such a case, the so-called right of
first refusal applies only to an interest which has a right to share in the profits, the
assets, and the management of the enterprise. However, if the interest of a member
of a professional service organization constitutes a right to share in the profits of the
organization which is contingent upon and inseparable from the member's continuing
employment relationship with the organization, and the transfer of such interest is
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neously with the applicable statute and was considered inconsistent with
the statute's longstanding interpretation.4 Kurzner v. United States, 413
F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
The term "association" has long been treated as synonymous with
the term "corporation" for purposes of taxation, and thus the definition
of these forms of business entities is necessarily the first step in the treat-
ment of professional service corporations by the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service. The leading case which defines "association" and "cor-
poration" as business entities is Morrissey v. Commissioner,' where trust-
ees of an express trust sought to upset a ruling of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue which treated the trust as an association for purposes
of taxation. The Court stated that:
[Association] implies the entering into a joint enterprise and as
the applicable regulation imports,' an enterprise for the trans-
action of business.
The inclusion of associations with corporations implies
resemblance; but it is resemblance and not identity. The resem-
blance points to features distinguishing associations from part-
nerships as well as from ordinary trusts. . .. [T]he classi-
subject to a right of first refusal, such interest is subject to a power in the other
members of the organization to determine not only the individuals whom the or-
ganization is to employ, but also who may share with them in the profits of the
organization. The possession by other members of the power to determine, in con-
nection with the transfer of such an interest, whom the organization is to employ is
so substantial a hindrance upon the free transferability of interests in the organiza-
tion that such power precludes the existence of a modified form of free transfer-
ability of interests. Therefore, if a member of a professional service organization
who possesses such an interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is
not a member of the organization only after having first offered his interest to the
other members of the organization at its fair market value, the corporate characteristic
of free transferability of interests does not exist.
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701, as pertinent hereto provides:
(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly
incompatible with the intent thereof-
(2) PARTNERSHIP AND PARTNER.-The term "partnership" includes a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization, through
or by means of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on,
and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or a corporation;
and the term "partner" includes a member in such a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or organization. (Emphasis added.)
(3) CORPORATION.-The term "corporation" includes associations, joint
stock companies, and insurance companies. (Emphasis added.)
(b) INCLUDES AND INCLUDINo.-GThe terms "includes" and "including" when used in
a definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things other-
wise within the meaning of the term defined.
5. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
6. Treas. Reg. 65, § 2, art. 1504, T.D. 3748, IV-2 CUM. BULL. 7 (1925), in pertinent
part provides:
[e]ven in the absence of any control by the beneficiaries, where the trustees are not
restricted to the mere collection of funds and their payment to the beneficiaries, but
are associated together with similar or greater powers than the directors in a corpo-
ration for purpose of carrying on some business enterprise, the trust is an association
within the meaning of the statute.
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fication cannot be said to require organization under a statute,
or with statutory privileges. The term embraces associations
as they may exist at common law.' (Footnote 6 added.)
Five factors were determined by the Supreme Court as providing a
basis for treating the trust therein as a corporation. Continuity of life,
limited liability, opportunity for centralized management, ability to hold
title to property, and transferability of interests were to become the cri-
teria for passing the "resemblance test,"8 as it was established by the
Morrissey decision and used in Pelton v. Commissioner' and subsequent
cases.'" This test is often argued by the Government in its constant litiga-
tion of the issue of professional-corporation taxation.
In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service suffered resounding defeats in
United States v. Kintner," in the Ninth Circuit, and Galt v. United
States, 2 in the Northern District of Texas. These cases held that pro-
fessional associations formed by physicians were sufficiently corporate
in form to constitute associations for purposes of federal taxation. The
Internal Revenue Service attempted to counter these defeats through
the passage of Treasury Regulations sections 301.7701-1 through
301.7701-11," which have come to be known as the Kintner Regulations.
These regulations constituted an attempt on the part of the Internal
Revenue Service to restrict the definition of "corporation." Four criteria
were established as a test of corporateness: (1) continuity of life; (2)
centralization of management; (3) limited liability; and (4) free transfer-
ability of interests. 4 The regulations further state that a general or
limited partnership "subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform
Partnership Act"' 5 cannot possess the first three characteristics.
These regulations thus excluded any entities subject to a partner-
ship act, which would insure exclusion of most professional groups. Then
the Internal Revenue Service seemingly defeated its own purpose through
the passage of a Treasury Regulation in 1960, which provided that
"[1] ocal law governs in determining whether the legal relationships which
have been established in the formation of an organization are such that
7. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 356-57 (1935). The Court held that trusts
created as mediums for carrying on a business enterprise and sharing its gains were suffi-
ciently analogous to corporate organizations to justify the conclusion that Congress intended
that the income of the enterprise should be taxed in the same manner as that of a corpora-
tion. The trust method permits continuity, centralized management, and limited liability and
facilitates the transfer of beneficial interests and the introduction of large numbers of
participants. Id. at 359.
8. Id. at 359.
9. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
10. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Galt v. United States, 175
F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959) ; Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
11. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
12. 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
13. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11 (1960).
14. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 553.
15. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(3), (c)(4), (d)(1), T.D. 6503 (1960).
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the standards are met."' 6 This regulation was the raison d' etre behind
the passage of professional service corporation statutes or attorney gen-
erals' opinions in many states.17
When the Internal Revenue Service realized what it had done, it
sought to remedy its action by amending the Kintner Regulations to
provide that professional groups cannot be corporations for purposes of
federal taxation.'8 Enforcement of the amendment, however, has proved
to be unsuccessful for the Internal Revenue Service. In the instant case,
Kurzner v. United States,"9 the court declared that the regulations as
amended are "arbitrary and discriminatory legislation by an administra-
tive agency which is only authorized to interpret congressional acts."2
The court went on to say that:
[a] professional service corporation is virtually identical in
operation to a nonprofessional service corporation, the real
difference-for tax purposes-being that professionals have
traditionally been barred from operating in corporate form
while nonprofessionals have not. Since December 31, 1921,
personal service corporations have been taxed as corporations
rather than partnerships. There is no reason, in either policy
or fact for different tax treatment of various kinds of personal
service corporations. The preclusion of professional service
corporations from corporate status is wholly arbitrary and
discriminatory and, therefore, cannot and will not be counte-
nanced by this court.2
1
The plaintiff in Kurzner was an employee of Gregory Orthopedic
Associates, P.A., an entity organized in accordance with Florida's Pro-
fessional Service Corporation Act, which was passed in 1961. This
professional association had been formed in 1961 by an orthopedic sur-
geon practicing in Dade County for the purpose of acquiring all of the
assets and liabilities of his medical practice. On June 1, 1961, plaintiff
entered into an employment contract with the association, and in Decem-
ber, 1962, he became a director and vice president. In response to an
attempt by the Government to hold the plaintiff liable as a 50% partner
for purposes of taxation, with an assessment and collection of taxes
from the plaintiff as though he were a partner in a partnership, plaintiff
brought suit against the Government in the district court. 2 The plaintiff
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
17. Forty-seven states now have professional association permissive laws; only Wyoming,
Iowa, the District of Columbia, and New York do not permit professional corporations. Many
states require only one incorporator, e.g., CONN. PuB. ACT No. 729, § 2 (1969) ; N.C. LAWS
ch. 751 (June 24, 1969) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 392, § 12 (1969). FLA, ATT'Y GEN. Or.
61-109 (July 7, 1961).
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 553.
19. 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
20. Id. at 106.
21. Id. at 111.
22. 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
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alleged that he should have been taxed as a corporation rather than as
a partnership. The court sustained his contention, as did the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.23 Gregory Orthopedic Associates, P.A., was
determined to be qualified as a corporation under the pre-1965 regula-
tions, and section 301.7701-2(h) of the 1965 Treasury Regulations was
declared invalid. Plaintiff was thus entitled to a refund for the Govern-
ment's improper assessment of taxes.24
The court in Kurzner could see no reason, as stated in the opinion
on appeal,
in either policy or fact for different tax treatment of various
kinds of personal service corporations .... Since 1936 the courts
have permitted professional associations to achieve corporate
status . . . . If Congress has intended to exclude professional
groups from corporate status, it seems quite likely that it would
have passed legislation to counteract...
the judicial decisions in Pelton,26 Kintner,27 Galt,2 and Foreman.2 9
Throughout the numerous litigations since the Kintner and Galt
decisions," the Government had contended that Treasury Regulations
23. Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. Id. at 112.
25. 413 F.2d 97, 111 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), wherein a group of physicians
operated a clinic as a trust. The physician-trustees divided transferable shares representing
beneficial interests, exempting themselves from personal liability for duties performed, and
allowing modification of the trust on a vote of 51% of the shareholders. The court held the
entity was taxable as an association (in effect, as a corporation).
27. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). A group of doctors adopted
articles of association which appear to have been designed to reflect the incidents of corpo-
rateness enunciated in Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936), and Morrissey v.
Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). After the Kintner decision, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, "[a]s guardian and protector of the public exchequer" [Kurzner v. United States,
413 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1969)], changed his attitude toward professional service corpo-
rations and attempted to narrow the definition of "corporation" and "association" for pur-
poses of taxation.
28. Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959), involved a situation
similar to Kintner (See note 28 supra.), and the Internal Revenue Service was again the loser.
29. Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964), was the first decision
in Florida dealing with the taxation of professional service corporations. The Internal Revenue
Service was defeated.
30. United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D.
Colo. 1968), held that a professional service corporation organized under a state corporation
code was entitled to be taxed as a corporation and that the 1965 Treasury Regulations pro-
viding that such an organization should not be so classified for purposes of taxation as a
corporation were unreasonable, inconsistent with the revenue statutes, invalid, and amounted
to an attempt to legislate. See also Wallace v. United States, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1969), aff'g
294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ariz. 1968) (Regulation under § 7701 precluding professional asso-
ciations from corporate status invalid because such regulations are inconsistent with the
statute and judicial construction thereof) ; O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir.
1969), aff'g 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(c), -2(h) (1965) invalid
insofar as they require a corporation created under state law to be treated as something other
than a corporation for federal tax purposes); Smith v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016
(S.D. Fla. 1969) (Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965) invalid because of an apparent incon-
sistency between the regulation and the Code and because the regulation is unreasonable,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
section 301.7701-2(h) (1965) was merely a definition of the corporate
characteristics set forth in the 1960 Regulations and in Morrissey with
particular application to professional service corporations. The court in
Kurzner felt that "[p]aragraph (h) was obviously designed to thwart
the efficacy of state professional association acts to confer corporate
status under the Kintner Regulations."'"
The Kurzner case was the test case on the issue of federal taxation
of professional service corporations for the Fifth Circuit, and the defeat
of the Internal Revenue Service follows similar defeats in the Sixth 2
and Tenth Circuits.3 On August 8, 1969, the Internal Revenue Service
announced that it is conceding that organizations of doctors, lawyers
and other professional people organized under state professional associa-
tions acts will, generally, be treated as corporations for tax purposes. 4
The Solicitor General, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney
General (Tax Division), the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and
Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, decided not to apply to
the Supreme Court for certiorari in the Kurzner"5 case. This decision does
not preclude the Government from drawing different conclusions in any
case presenting different circumstances.
The Government will not seek certiorari in O'Neill v. United States,36
United States v. Empey 37 Holder v. United States,3" and Wallace v.
United States,3 9 and no appeal will be prosecuted in any other pending
cases decided adversely to the government on the same issue involving
similar facts. All similar cases now in litigation or under audit will be
reviewed to see if they should be conceded.4
Implementing instructions will be issued to field personnel-if
providing stricter criteria for professional service as opposed to nonprofessional service or-
ganizations); Cochran v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ariz. 1969) (Treas. Reg.
§§ 301.7701-2(a) to (h) (1965) invalid as an attempt to legislate); Holder v. United States,
289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969) (mem.) ("(T]he
issues presented in this case have been fully decided adversely to the appellant, United States
of America, in Kurzner v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 413 F.2d 97.").
31. 413 F.2d at 109 (5th Cir. 1969).
32. O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969), aff'g 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D.
Ohio 1968).
33. United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D.
Colo. 1967).
34. INT. REV. SERV. Technical Information Release No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969) (INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, § 7701).
35. Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
36. 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969), afi'g 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
37. 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
38. 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'g 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
39. - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1969), aff'g 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
40. INT. REV. SaRV. Technical Information Release No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969).
This announcement on the part of the Internal Revenue Service will probably preclude
appeal by the Government in the following recent cases: Aloha v. United States, 300 F. Supp.
1055 (D. Minn. 1969); Williams v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969); Smith
v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D. Fla. 1969) ; Van Epps v. United States, 301 F. Supp.
256 (D. Ariz. 1969); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, Civil No. 68-C-28 (D. Okla., Mar. 4,
1969).
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necessary on a state-by-state basis-as soon as possible. In
addition, appropriate modifications of existing regulations will
be required consistent with these decisions.4"
Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-2(h), promulgated in 1965, seems
to be approaching rigor mortis. The Internal Revenue Service might,
however, find new grounds for attack under section 269 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, which gives the Commissioner discretionary
authority to attack the acquisition of control of a corporation if the
principal purpose of the acquisition was to secure tax benefits.42
At the present stage, the Internal Revenue Service seems tired of
the fruitless litigation in which it has engaged. The future seems bright for
professionals who desire to incorporate, especially in light of Technical
Information Release No. 1019, distributed August 8, 1969,11 and the
fact that:
No case has been found holding that a business organized under
a state corporation law, calling itself a corporation, and actu-
ally operating under that form, should be characterized other
than as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.44
JUDITH R. SCHMUKLER
41. INT. REv. SERV. Technical Information Release No. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969).
42. Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 269 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 provide in part:
[Tihe principal purpose for which the acquisition was made must have been the
evasion of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit, or
other allowance which such other person, or persons, or corporation, would not
otherwise enjoy .... If the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds in
importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose. This does not mean that
only those acquisitions fall within the provisions of section 269 which would not
have been made if the evasion or avoidance purpose was not present. The deter-
mination of the purpose for which an acquisition was made requires a scrutiny of
the entire circumstances in which the transaction or course of conduct occured,
[sic] in connection with the tax result claimed to arise therefrom.
Treas. Reg. 1.269-3(a)(2) (1962). See also Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 n.17 (5th
Cir. 1969), where the court refused to give any opinion as to the possibility of success for the
Internal Revenue Service using section 269 as a ground for attack.
43. The amendment in Subtitle D contained in section 531 of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), which deals with Subchapter S Corporations,
will probably not affect the number of professional service corporations being formed at the
present. Section 531 applies the proprietorship or partnership rule to limit amounts set aside
for pensions with respect to a proprietor or partner owning more than 5% of the outstanding
stock of a tax-option corporation to 10% of the employee's income or $2,500 (if less than
10%), beginning with contributions made in 1971. This latter group would not include em-
ployees of professional service corporations electing treatment under Subchapter S. This
amendment has been codified in section 1379 of the Internal Revenue Code. The possibility
of further legislative revisions to the Internal Revenue Code with respect to professional
service corporations still remains an active threat, even though the amendment contained in
section 541 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), was not
passed. The latter section would have directly affected professional service corporations by
limiting amounts set aside for pensions by such corporations that had elected treatment under
Subchapter S.
44. Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49
MINN. L. Rv. 603, 625 (1965).
